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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Attorney and Client-Court has the
power to order compensation for attorney assigned to defend
indigent accused of committing a crime--State v. Rush (N.J.
1966).
Appellants were attorneys assigned to defend indigents accused
of noncapital felonies. They sought compensation for their serv-
ices and reimbursement for out of pocket expenses' on the
grounds that service without compensation violates constitu-
tional and statutory provisions because this (1) gives rise to
insufficient assistance of counsel thereby falling below consti-
tutional standards; (2) is a taking of private property for public
use without just compensation; (3) is a taking of property with-
out due process of law denying equal protection under the law;
(4) is involuntary servitude; and (5) is peonage. 2 The trial
court denied compensation. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
New Jersey, held, modified3 and affirmed. The court does have
the power to order compensation based on its exclusive control
in the area of setting standards and obligations for the legal
profession of the state.4 Reasoning that the burden on the pro-
fession was too much to bear alone, the court ordered that ap-
pointed counsel were entitled to compensation, but the order
was not to become effective until January 1, 1967. This time
was set in order to give the legislature an opportunity to provide
a suitable plan for appointment of counsel and to provide a
source from which the compensation could be paid. State v.
Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966). (6-to-O).
Most courts faced with this question have held contrary to
State v. Rush.5 Their decisions can be separated on the basis of
reasoning into two categories. The first, more directly rebutting
the constitutional arguments, is on the ground that the attorney
is an officer of the court and the court has the power to order
1. N.J.S.A. 2A :163-1 provides compensation only in capital cases.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1867).
3. The court reversed the trial court decision denying reimbursement for
out of pocket expenses citing State v. Horton, 34 N.J. 518, 170 A.2d 1 (1961)
in which the court stated a rule, which the trial court interpreted as merely
"dictum," that counsel was entitled to reimbursement. The court said this had
become a necessity because of "an interplay of the constitutional rights to
counsel, to a fair trial, and equality before the law."
4. The court based this on N.J. CONST., art. VI, § 2, which provides that:
"The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice
of law and the discipline of the persons admitted."
5. 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966).
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the attorney to serve without compensation.( The second and
most popular ground, tending more to circumvent than rebut
the constitutional arguments, is that in the absence of statutory
authority the court does not have the power to order com-
pensation.7
The decisions of the minority, that compensation can be or-
dered, have been based on three reasons. In Webb v. Baird8 the
Indiana court held that to assign counsel without compensation
violated the state constitution in that it was a class discrimina-
tion and an unconstitutional tax.0 The second category, the opin-
ion of the Wisconsin court in County of Dane v. Smith,0 is that
it is not within the power of the legislature to give the courts
the power to appoint an attorney and at the same time destroy
an implied promise to pay for these services. The third category
is that service without compensation violates the fifth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. The Iowa court in lall
v. Vashington County" said:
This is not a case of voluntary services. It is a fundamental
rule of right, established by the Constitution of the United
States, that private property shall not be taken without just
compensation. The service was required by competent legal
authority, which, having been rendered, the attorney is en-
titled to his pay for it.12
6. Elam v. Johnson, 48 Ga. 348 (1873) (the attorney is a sworn officer
and duties attach to his office); State v. Clifton, 242 La. 495, 172 So.2d 657
(1965) (a professional obligation); People ex rel. Whedon v. Washington
County, 192 App. Div. 205, 183 N.Y. Supp. 483 (1920) (officer of the court) ;
Presby v. Klickitat County, 5 Wash. 329, 31 Pac. 876 (1892) (gratuitous
services are a part of an attorney's duty). See also United States v. Dillon,
346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 550 (1965); Dolan v.
United States, 351 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965).
7. Cases cited note 6 su pra. See also State v. Simmons, 42 La. Ann. 991,
10 So. 382 (1891); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 113 Pa. Super 348, 173 At.
868 (1934) ; Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 133 P. 2d 325 (1943).
8. 6 Ind. 13 (1854).
9. IND. CONST. § 21, art. 1. See State ex rel. Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572, 34
N.E.2d 129 (1941) (dicta); Knox County Council v. McCormick, 217 Ind.
493, 29 N.E.2d 405 (1940) ; Blythe v. State, 4 Ind. 525 (1853).
10. 13 Wis. 585 (1861). See Carpenter v. County of Dane, 9 Wis. 274
(1859) where the court said: "It may be that he [the lawyer] is interested in
seeing justice done, but not really more so than any other citizen." But cf.
Green Lake County v. Waupaca County, 113 Wis. 435, 89 N.W. 549 (1902).
11. 2 G. Greene 473 (Iowa 1850). See Ferguson v. Pottawattamie County,
224 Iowa 516, 273 N.W. 223 (1938) where the court held counsel defending
minors were entitled to compensation in line with the reasoning in Hall
But cf. Samuels v. County of Dubuque, 13 Iowa 536 (1862).
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The New Jersey court in Rush fashioned another view and
held that it did have the power to order counsel to serve without
compensation based on its exclusive responsibility in the area of
setting standards and obligations for the legal profession and
because the attorney is an officer of the court.18 But the court
rejected the majority's view that to order compensation was a
legislative function.1 4 The court reasoned that with the greater
complexity of the trial at present and greater emphasis on ap-
peals and habeas corpus proceedings, the burden is too great for
the legal profession to bear alone. This view is unique. However
because of the difficulty of administering such an order, the
court gave the legislature an opportunity to enact legislation
providing for appointment of counsel and a method of assessing
costs. To guide the legislature the court expressed its view that
the amount of compensation should be sixty percent of the aver-
age fee for the type case involved.
Since the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,15 followed by
those in Douglas v. California1" and Escobedo v. Illinois,17 the
emphasis on appointed counsel has necessarily become greater.
Most states have since Gideon enacted statutes providing assist-
ance of counsel for the indigent and compensation for the ap-
pointed counsel.' The compensation in the more recent statutes
ranges from a modest fifty dollars' 9 to 1500 dollars.20 The de-
cision in Gideon had its greatest impact on five Southern states,
Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina and South Caro-
lina," 1 which, theretofore, had provisions only for appointment
of counsel in capital cases and a few special cases.2 2 All of these
except South Carolina have enacted legislation providing counsel
13. See note 6 ,supra and accompanying text.
14. See note 9 stupra and accompanying text.
15. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (that indigent defendants must have counsel for
trial).
16. 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (that indigent defendant must have counsel on
appeal).
17. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (when investigation begins to focus on a particular
suspect should be allowed assistance of counsel).
18. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR, 16-17, 253-67 (1965).
19. MIss. CODE § 2505 (Supp. 1964). Counsel is given 50 dollars if the
defendant is indicted for noncapital felony but the case is disposed of without
trial.
20. N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722-b. (Supp. 1965). The maximum for one attor-
ney assigned to defend indigent charged with a capital crime. The same
section also provides another 1500 dollars maximum for one attorney for
appeal of a conviction where the sentence is life imprisonment or death.
21. Silverstein, The Continuing Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright on the
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for the indigent and compensation for the appointed attorney.23
This places South Carolina in a group of four states in which
no compensation whatsoever is given to assigned counsel.2 4 The
Rush decision becomes important to these four states because,
if legislatures in these states fail to act, it gives the courts a new
ground on which an order granting compensation can be placed,
that of an unfair burden on the legal profession.
For the South Carolina legislature there is a vast source from
which it can draw information to serve as guides for enacting
such legislation. The public defender system could be adopted,25
or the legislature could provide for the appointment of private
counsel and leave to the court the power to set the amount of
compensation.2 0 The legislature could also provide for an hourly
rate with a fixed maximum,"7 or even a combination of the maxi-
mum sum and the court-fixed sum.
28
There has been a recent move in the South Carolina legislature
to enact such legislation. A bill"9 introduced in the house of
representatives in 1965 provided for counsel for indigent defend-
ants30 and also provided for reimbursement for out of pocket
expenses.3 1 This bill, however, did not provide compensation for
the appointed attorney except for a judgment against the de-
fendant in favor of the attorney in the amount of the usual fee
for such cases.3 2 The bill is no longer being actively considered
23. Ibid. See also ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 318 (11) (Supp. 1963); FLA. STAT.
§ 27.50 (Supp. 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-4.1 to -5.3 (Supp. 1965).
24. Silverstein, supra note 21, at 1025. The states are Kentucky, Louisiana,
Missouri and South Carolina. At present the only statutory provision in
South Carolina for the appointment of counsel, S.C. CODE § 17-507 (1962), is
in capital cases. The statute is silent on the matter of compensation for counsel
and it has never been questioned on this point before the South Carolina
Supreme Court.
25. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 27.50 (Supp. 1964).
26. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 978a (Supp. 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-5
(Supp. 1965).
27. E.g., Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A; N.Y. COUNTY
LAW § 722-b (Supp. 1965).
28. OHIO REV, CODE § 2941.51 (A)-(C) (Supp. 1965).
29. A BILL-PROVIDING FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL TO REPRESENT
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS (Calendar No. H. 1762, read for the first time May
20, 1965) [Hereinafter referred to as PROPOSED BILL]. This bill, except for
provision for compensation, was patterned substantially after the North Caro-
lina statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-4.1 (Supp. 1965). See generally Comment,
17 S.C.L. REv. 741 (1965); 42 N.C.L. REv. 322 (1964).
30. PROPOSED BILL § 1.
31. Ibid.
32. PROPOSED BILL § 3. The judgment provides for garnishment of defend-
ant's wages to pay attorney's fee.
[Vol. is
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since the drafters are working in conjunction with the South
Carolina Bar Association on a new proposal.2 3
The South Carolina Bar Association plan is very thorough,
not only providing counsel for indigents for trial, but also for
appeal and habeas corpus proceedings. This plan proposes com-
pensation for counsel at a rate of fifteen dollars an hour for
court time and ten dollars an hour for out of court time with
maximums set at 750 dollars for capital cases and 500 dollars
for noncapital cases.3 4 The need for such legislation has become
great since Gideon, and Senator Ervin of North Carolina has
criticized the system like the one presently employed in South
Carolina (appointed, uncompensated counsel) 35 as "not at all
conducive to the effective administration of justice.130 He bases
this conclusion on the fact that many young lawyers, and in
some instances older and more affluent lawyers, cannot afford
the expenses of preparing an adequate defense, especially in the
longer trials. 37 He also notes that most prosecutors desire ade-
quate defenses because there is afterwards less chance of a re-
versal of a conviction because of ineffective assistance of
counsel. 33
One writer has said on the subject:
It is too much to expect all lawyers in the latter class [un-
compensated] to investigate and prepare as thoroughly as
the lawyers in the first category [compensated], though
some no doubt do so. This difference in compensation ...
raises the question of equal protection for indigent defend-
ants. Lack of reimbursement for expenses of investigation
is especially disturbing, since the appointed lawyer faces
the dilemma of cutting short his investigation or contribu-
33. For a discussion of the results of this work see Proposed Defense of In-
digents Act in South Carolina, 18 S.C.L. REV. 380 (1966).
34. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR OF THE EXECU-
TIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION, DEFENSE OF
INDIGENTS ACT WITH COM-MITTEE FINDINGS AND REPORT (1966). The same
hourly rates are found in the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006
A (d) (with a maximum of 300 dollars for misdemeanors and 500 dollars for
felonies) ; and N.Y. COUNTY LAWS § 722-b (Supp. 1965) (with a maximum
of 1500 dollars for one attorney in a capital case, 500 dollars in felony case,
and 300 dollars in a misdemeanor case).
35. Silverstein, supra note 21, at 1024. Cf., Pitt v. MacDougald, 245 S.C. 98,
138 S.E. 2d 840 (1964).
36. Ervin, Uncompensated Counsel: They Do Not Meet the Constitutional
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ting his funds in addition to his time. Some lawyers, espe-
cially younger ones, can ill afford such cash outlays.
39
(Emphasis added.)
It is hoped that the plan proposed by the South Carolina Bar
Association will be enacted into law without substantial changes,
but in the event the legislature fails to act the courts of South
Carolina, as did one in Florence County,40 may begin to order
compensation, and the reasoning behind the Rush decision may
afford a new and valuable ground on which the courts may rely
in issuing such an order.
Roy L. F mum
39. Silverstein, supra note 21, at 16-17.
40. REcommENDED PLAN p2 .
[Vol. 18
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--Home Subscription Television-
Initiative measure adopted by California electorate banning
home subscription television held an abridgment of free speech
guaranties of federal and state constitutions- Veaver v. Jordan
(Cal. 1966).
An initiative measure adopted by the general electorate of
California in November 1964 entitled the "Free Television Act"'
undertook to ban the business of home subscription television
from the state. Subsequent to its enactment, the plaintiffs at-
tempted to file articles of incorporation for the formation of a
corporation for the purpose of engaging in the home subscription
television business. The secretary of state refused to file the
articles and the plaintiffs brought this action for declaratory
relief. The trial court concluded that the act was in violation of
both the federal and state constitutional guaranties of free
speech. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Califorriia, held,
affirmed. The act contravenes the free speech guaranties of the
federal and state constitutions because it could not be shown that
a "clear and present danger" of a substantive evil would result
from the existence of subscription television. Weaver 'v. Jordan,
411 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1966). (6-to-1).
A majority of the court in Weaver v. Jordan2 reasoned that
since first amendment freedoms of press, speech, and religion
are protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment from invasion by state action3 and since communication
by motion picture, radio, and television falls within the consti-
tutional protection,4 a statute which undertakes to totally pro-
hibit home subscription television could "be imposed only to
avoid a 'clear and present danger' that a substantive evil will
otherwise result which the state has a right to prevent."r5 The
1. CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 43-1 to -7 (Supp. 1965).
2. 411 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1966).
3. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960);
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S.
313 (1958); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Grosjean v. American Press,
297 U.S. 233 (1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1924).
4. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Kingsley International
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of New York State, 360 U.S. 684 (1959) ;
Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954); Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Public Util. Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 45 (1952); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 226 (1943); American Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 110 F.
Supp. 374, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), afj'd on other grounds, 347 U.S. 284 (1954) ;
1966]
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evil, that "the 'development' of the subscription television busi-
ness would have an 'adverse effect' upon existing television sta-
tions," was at the very least debatable and not a "clear and
present danger" which would justify the "sweeping and absolute
suppression attempted by the Act."6
The first amendment has been relaxed to some extent in broad-
casting cases because of the limited number of available fre-
quencies. 7 The Federal Communications Commission has au-
thority to regulate broadcasting "as public convenience, interest,
or necessity requires . . . ."s But the extent of this relaxation
has never been clearly expressed by the courts.0
Of the various tests for reconciling freedom of expression with
other social values, the "bad tendency" test was one of the ear-
liest to command a majority of the Supreme Court.'0 Under this
test any expression tending to lead to substantial evil could be
prohibited." This test, rejected by the Court in Dennis v. United
Btates'2 has been abandoned.' 3
The "clear and present danger" test, first enunciated by Mr.
Justice Holmes in Schencko v. United States,'4 superseded the
"bad tendency" test.15 Under this doctrine, "the question in every
case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent.""' This test was a substantial advance over the "bad
tendency" test and was employed by the Court until the early
19501S. 17 Its principal application was in the regulation of sub-
versive activity.' Abandoned by a majority of the Court in the
Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497, 507, cert. den.,
338 U.S. 912 (1949).
5. Weaver v. Jordan, supra note 2, at 295.
6. Id. at 296.
7. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
8. 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609, § 303 (1964).
9. Comment, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 1378, 1421 (1965).
10. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1924) ; Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 909-10 (1963).
11. Gitlow v. New York, supra note 10, at 667.
12. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
13. Emerson, supra note 10.
14. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
15. Emerson, supra note 10.
16. Schenck v. United States, supra note 14, at 52.
17. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) ; Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
18. E.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) ; Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Schenck v. United States, supra note 14. See
also, Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. RE. 1, 8 (1965).
[Vol. 18
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Dennis case,1 9 its substitute was "the gravity of the evil dis-
counted by its improbability."20 Although the "clear and present
danger" test has had recent application in the area of punish-
ment in criminal contempt for publications critical of courts
and judges, 21 there are many who doubt that the test has much
vitality today.
22
The "balancing" test originated in 1939 in Schneider v. New
Jersey23 but was first clearly enunciated by Chief Justice Vinson
in American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds.24 According to
Professor Emerson of Yale, "the court must, in each case, bal-
ance the individual and social interest in freedom of expression
against the social interest sought by the regulation which re-
stricts expression." 25 The "balancing" test has been used pri-
marily in the case of regulations not intended directly to con-
demn the content of speech but incidentally limiting its exer-
cise.26 In most recent free speech cases, the "balancing" test has
been adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court as the method
of decision.27
Of the two remaining noteworthy views, the "redeeming social
importance" test28 has been applied primarily in obscenity cases '"
and the "absolute" view30 has never prevailed within the Court.3 '
From the foregoing, it would appear that the "balancing" test
would be the correct test to apply to a statute prohibiting pay
19. Dennis v. United States, supra note 17.
20. Id. at 510; Emerson, supra note 10, at 912.
21. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
22. Brennan, supra note 18; Emerson, mipra note 10, at 912; Frantz, The
First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1428 (1962) ; see Annot.,
2 L. Ed. 2d 1706, 1709 (1958) ; Annot., 11 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 1125 (1964).
23. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
24. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
25. Emerson, supra note 10, at 912.
26. Brennan, supra note 18, at 913.
27. Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Communist Party of
United States v. Subversive Activities Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961) ; Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) ; Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43
(1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Wilkinson v. United
States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961) ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) ;
Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) ; Emerson, supra note 10 at 912; Frantz,
supra note 22, at 1432; see Annot., 11 L. Ed. 2d, supra note 22, at 1121-22.
28. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See also, Brennan,
supra note 18, at 5.
29. Brennan, supra note 18, at 5-6. See Annot., 11 L. Ed. 2d, supra note 22, at
1129-34.
30. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (dissenting opinion
of Douglas, J., in which Black, J., concurred). See also Brennen, supra note
18, at 4.
31. Brennan, supra note 18, at 5.
1966]
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television. 2 As one writer has framed the issue, whether or not
the statute is unconstitutional "depends on the relationship be-
tween two components: the extent to which the prohibition
abridges a first amendment freedom and the extent to which
characteristics peculiar to the activity, in light of the state's in-
terest in enacting the statute, tend to justify the abridgment."3
Pay television may provide programs unavailable on commer-
cial television, for example theater or night club entertainment,
opera, concerts, and sports, so that prohibition of pay television
may directly prohibit the expression of some ideas or messages.3 4
Further, since it is well known that those providing television
revenue currently dictate program content, assertion of govern-
mental power over the selection of the source of television
revenue is an indirect assumption of control over broadcast
content.35
The asserted justification for the abridgment is the protection
of commercial television. Any danger to the commercial tele-
vision industry from pay television appears to be highly specu-
lative, especially in view of the amount of money currently being
spent by television advertisers.30
Thus, it would seem that a balancing of the interests yields
the same result reached by the majority of the California court
applying the "clear and present danger" test. In any event, it
appears that if the question reaches the United States Supreme
Court, they will hold as did the California court that a statute
prohibiting pay television is unconstitutional.
Jomx M. H.AnmGoTox
32. C.f., Brennan, m.pra note 18, at 9; Emerson, supra note 10, at 910-12.
Comment, 53 CALIP. L. REv. 1378 (1965).
33. Comment, 53 CAUiF. L. REv. 1378, 1421 (1965).
34. Id. at 1422.
35. Id. at 1423.
36. Weaver v. Jordan, supra note 4; Subscription Television Serv., 26
F.C.C. 265 (1959); Comment, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1378, 1378-80 (1965).
[Vol. 18
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Voting Rights Act of 1965-As
against the reserved powers of the states, Congress may use any
rational means to enforce the constitutional prohibitions against
racial discrimination in voting-South Carolina v. Katzenbah
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
By leave of the Supreme Court,' South Carolina filed a bill
of complaint, asking that certain provisions of the Voting Rights
Act of 19652 be declared unconstitutional, and requesting that
1. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 382 U.S. 898 (1965).
2. 79 Stat. 437. The specific sections of the Act objected to by South Caro-
lina and found to be properly before the Court were:
A. § 4(a) which provides that in any state or other political subdivision
found to come within the tests of § 4(b), no citizen may be denied the right
to vote because of his inability to pass the requirements of any test or device,
unless such state or subdivision has brought suit for a declaratory judgment
in the District Court of the District of Columbia and this court has deter-
mined that no test or device has been used by the plaintiff for the purpose or
with the effect of denying the right to vote on account of race or color.
However, if, prior to or subsequent to the passage of this Act, the plaintiff
has had a judgment rendered against it in any court of the United States
determining that the plaintiff state or subdivision used tests or devices to deny
the right to vote on the basis of race or color, no declaratory judgment will
be issued in its favor by the District Court for five years following such a
judgment.
§ 4(b) which states that the previsions of § 4(a) will apply to any state or
subdivision which (1) the Attorney General determines maintained on Novem-
ber 1, 1964, any test or device, and (2) the Director of the Bureau of the
Census finds that more than 50% of the persons of voting age in such district
either were not registered to vote on November 1, 1964, or did not vote in the
presidential election of 1964. This section also provides that the above findings
are not reviewable by any court.
§ 4(c) which defines "tests or devices" as any requirement that registration
applicants (1) demonstrate ability to read and write (2) demonstrate any
particular knowledge or educational level (3) possess good moral character or
(4) prove their qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members
of any other class.
§ 4(d) which provides "For the purposes of this section no State or politi-
cal subdivision shall be determined to have engaged in the use of tests or
devices for the purpose and with the effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color if (1) incidents of discriminatory use of
tests and devices have been few in number and have been promptly corrected
by local action (2) the continuing effect of such incidents has been eliminated,
and (3) there is no reasonable probability of their recurrence in the future."
South Carolina argued that §§ 4(a)-(d) violates the principle of equality
of the states, denies due process by employing an invalid presumption and by
barring judicial review of administrative findings, constitutes a forbidden bill
of attainder, and impaires the separation of powers by adjudicating guilt
through legislation.
B. § 5 which provides that whenever any state or subdivision with respect
to which the provisions of 4(a) are in effect wishes to enact any voting legis-
lation which would be different from that in effect on November 1, 1964, the
state must first submit the proposed legislation to the District Court of the
District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that the new law will not
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the Attorney General be enjoined from enforcing these provi-
sions. Original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court was founded
on the presence of controversy between a state and a citizen of
another state under article III, section 2 of the Constitution.
teld, the sections of the act properly before the Court are all
appropriate means for carrying out Congress' constitutional re-
sponsibilities and are consonant with all other provisions of the
Constitution. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 86 Sup. Ct. 803
(1966). (8-to-i).
The basic question presented by South Carolina 'v. Katzenbach"
was whether Congress had exceeded the power granted it by
section 2 of the fifteenth amendment. The most fundamental of
South Carolina's arguments were that (1) the act was formu-
lated so that it applied only to certain sections of the country,
thereby violating the principle of equality of the states, and (2)
the act allows the District Court of the District of Columbia to
This proceeding may be omitted if the legislation has been submitted by an
appropriate state official to the Attorney General and no objection has been
interposed by him within sixty days.
South Carolina objected to this section on the grounds that it infringes on
article III of the Constitution by directing the district court to issue advisory
opinions.
C. § 6(b) which provides for the appointment of special examiners to
register voters, prepare and maintain lists of qualified voters within those
localities which have come under § 4(b). These are to be appointed whenever
the Attorney General (1) has received twenty written complaints from such
an area that persons are being denied the right to vote on the basis of race or
color and he believes the complaints to be meritorious or (2) in consideration
of several factors, for example, whether the ratio of white to non-white voters
appears to be attributable to violations of the fifteenth amendment, he believes
the appointment of registrars to be necessary to enforce the guarantees of the
amendment.
South Carolina contended that this assignment of federal examiners abridges
due process by precluding judicial review of administrative findings and
impairs the separation of powers by giving the Attorney General judicial
powers.
D. § 9 which provides procedures for the challenging of listings prepared by
a federal examiner.
South Carolina maintained that the procedures were too slow and thereby
denied due process.
E. §§ 13(a) and 14(b) which provide that the District Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia shall be the only court (1) to issue declaratory judgments
that states or subdivisions under § 4(b) have had more than 50% of their
voting age populace registered and there is no longer any reason to believe
that persons will be denied their rights under the fifteenth amendment, (2) to
issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction against the
execution or enforcement of the act or any action of any federal employee
pursuant to the act.
South Carolina argued that these provisions abridge due process by limiting
litigation to a distant forum.
3. 86 Sup. Ct. 803 (1966).
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issue forbidden advisory opinions with regard to proposed voting
law legislation in the states which have come under the act.
The criterion for the adjudication of the too-powerful Con-
gress question, regardless of the circumstance, has been and con-
tinues to be Mr. Chief Justice Mlarshall's classic formulation laid
down in McCulloch v. Maryland4 :
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional. 5
This formula of appropriateness and rationality, used most
recently as the guiding principle in adjudicating civil rights
cases, 6 was heavily relied upon by the Court in announcing this
decision. By extending the formula to section 2 of the fifteenth
amendment the Court found that the "ground rules" for resolv-
ing the questions presented were:
As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress
may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional
prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.
Accordingly, in addition to the courts, Congress has full
remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition
against racial discrimination in voting.7
Though Congress has previously enacted no law which, on the
basis of purely administrative findings, would apply federal
remedial actions to particular sections of the country, there is
ample precedent for the procedure in state legislatures.8
In McGowen, v. Maryland9 a controversy had arisen over
Maryland's Sunday closing laws. The legislature had passed
many county-by-county exceptions which allowed retailers in
some counties to sell certain commodities on Sunday and forbade
the privilege to merchants in other areas. The petitioner, who
had been indicted for violating those laws, complained that they
4. 17 U.S. 6 (1819).
5. Id. at 421.
6. Cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-59
(1964) ; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964).
7. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra note 3, at 816-17.
8. E.g., Keenan v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 34 Cal. 2d 708, 214
P.2d 382 (1950); State v. Savage, 96 Ore. 53, 184 Pac. 567 (1919).
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were discriminatory and violated the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. In an eight to one decision the Su-
preme Court held that in the interest of affording to its citizens
the fullest enjoyment of the day of rest, it was within the power
of a state legislature to enact such laws and exceptions.
The question of equal protection was perhaps better answered
in Salsburg v. Maryland."0 In an effort to combat frequent
gambling law violations in a certain county, the Maryland legis-
lature passed a law enabling courts to admit illegally-seized evi-
dence only when used to prosecute gambling law violations in
that particular location. The Supreme Court approved the law,
saying that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment applied only to persons, not localities. Quoting from Bow-
man v. LewilB" the Court observed that the clause meant "that
no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection
of the laws which is enjoyed by the other persons or other
classes of persons in the same place and under like circum-
stances. 1
2
In the present case, the Court apparently found little diffi-
culty in analogizing the federal-state government relationship
to the state-county relationship with respect to this point. Hold-
ing that the doctrine of the equality of the states was no bar to
this approach, 13 the Court extended the privilege to the Congress
by saying, "In acceptable legislative fashion, Congress chose to
limit its attention to the geographic areas where immediate ac-
tion seemed necessary."' 4
It would now seem settled that in the light of the facts and
testimony before it, the Congress may properly determine for
9. 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting on first amend-
ment grounds).
10. 346 U.S. 545 (1954).
11. 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1880).
12. Salsburg v. Maryland, mspra note 10, at 551.
13. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, mupra note 3, at 819. It is interesting to
note that the Court chose not only to say that the equality of states doctrine did
not bar the approach used by Congress in the act, but went on to expressly
limit that doctrine, saying that it applied only to the terms upon which states
enter the union. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), cited by the court as
suggestive of this view, concerned only powers exercised by Congress, through
enabling acts. In fact, the last paragraph of that opinion would seem to be
directly contradictory to the limitation here placed on the doctrine. "[W]e
might add that the constitutional equality of the states is essential to the har-
monious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized.
When the equality disappears we may remain a free people, but the Union
will not be the Union of the Constitution." Id. at 580.
14. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, apra note 3, at 819.
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itself that its regulatory and remedial powers will be brought
to bear on specific sections of the country.
The same lack of precedent noted above exists for the act's
provision which requires those states and subdivisions which
have come under the act to submit proposed changes to their
voting laws to the District Court of the District of Columbia.
The District Court must issue a declaratory judgment on wheth-
er the proposed legislation has the purpose or will have the effect
of violating the constitutional protections of the fifteenth
amendment.' 5
The issuance of advisory opinions is not within the power of
the federal courts,' and nowhere has the rule been more strictly
applied than in the area of declaring legislation to be uncon-
stitutional.' 7 It was necessary, therefore, for the Court to deter-
mine that simply by enacting a new voting law the subject state
has brought about a "controversy" within the meaning of article
III of the Constitution. This was accomplished by the reasoning
that since the act automatically suspends all voting regulations
enacted after November 1, 1964, a state or subdivision wishing
to make use of a recent amendment to its voting laws has a con-
crete and immediate controversy with the federal government.
In Public Util. Conm'n v. United States,8 cited by the Court
in support of this reasoning, the government had brought suit
for declaratory relief from a new California law which required
public carriers to obtain approval from the Commission before
granting free transportation or reduced rates to Government
agencies. The Commission asserted that since no action had as
yet been taken by it, there was no controversy over which the
courts might exercise jurisdiction. The Supreme Court rejected
this argument, saying that since the law was in effect and since
the Commission had indicated an intention to enforce it, there
was a concrete controversy over whether the United States
15. See discussion accompanying note 2, paragraph B.
16. E.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of Motor Coach Employees, Div. 998 v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 416 (1951) ; McGrath v. Kristen-
sen, 340 U.S. 162 (1950).
17. See Chicago & G. T. Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892). Mr. Justice
Brewer summarizes the Court's attitude by observing that it is the duty of the
courts to decide whether or not a statute is unconstitutional: "[Sjuch an
exercise of power is the ultimate and supreme function of courts. It is legiti-
mate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of a real,
earnest, and vital controversy between individuals." Id. at 345.
18. 355 U.S. 534 (1958) (Three justices dissenting).
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might obtain transportation services at such rates as it might
negotiate or do so only with the Commission's approval.
The support lent by this decision to the reasoning noted above
is nebulous at best. The California case involved a law which
on its face purported to violate the Constitution and thus, had
it been enforced, would have perpetrated an injustice. Conversely,
section 5 of the act in question requires that a court decide wheth-
er or not a proposed law might have an unconstitutional effect
in practice, regardless of its announced purpose and provisions.
In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,'0 the Court said that "a
controversy appropriate for judicial determination must be a
real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from
an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.
'20
Furthermore, the Chief Justice, who wrote the KatzenbacA
opinion, himself joined in the dissent to the California decision,
saying, "we should not reach this conclusion before giving Cali-
fornia an opportunity to interpret and implement this enactment
so that we can fairly judge whether it does in truth trespass upon
paramount federal interests."2 1
If section 5 of the act does not call for an advisory opinion it
has become more than a little difficult to define what an advisory
opinion is.
In summary, the law with respect to congressional power
granted by "enforcement" clauses now appears to be that so long
as Congress has made a reasonable determination that an uncon-
stitutional practice exists somewhere in the country it may, with-
out exceeding constitutional bounds, enact special laws, regula-
tions, and remedies to affect only that part of the nation, and
may not only suspend the comparable state laws but may require
such state or subdivision to obtain federal court approval before
putting into effect any amendments or new laws affecting the
area under congressional scrutiny.
J. SPRATr WHITE
19. 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
20. Id. at 241. (Emphasis added.)
21. Public Util. Comn'n v. United States, supra note 18, at 546.
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-Duty To Support k Child Not For-
mally Adopted-One standing in loco parentis to a child can
terminate the relationship at will-Chestnut v. Chestnut (S.C.
1966).
The plaintiff brought an action against her estranged husband
for support of their fifteen year old foster son. The child had
been left in their care shortly after his birth and was given the
family name but was never formally adopted. Upon the separa-
tion of the foster parents, the husband refused to continue his
support of the child. Based on a finding that the obligation to
support, once assumed by receiving the child into the family,
could not be terminated by the separation of the foster parents,
the lower court ordered the husband to support the child. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, held, reversed.
The husband stood in loco parentis to the child and could termi-
nate this relationship at will. Chestnut v. Chestnut, 147 S.E.2d
269 (S.C. 1966). (5-to-O).
A person standing in loco parentis to one other than his own
natural child is one who assumes all the obligations of a parent-
child relationship and holds the child out to the world as his
own, but never formally adopts him.' However, the rights of
the child who stands in such relationship to his parent are lim-
ited. It has been held in South Carolina2 that he is not a "child"
for the purpose of the wrongful death statute, and therefore,
that he cannot bring an action for the wrongful death of his
foster parent.3 Further, a foster child who has not been legally
adopted in strict compliance with the provisions of the South
Carolina adoption statutes4 has been held5 not to be a "child"
within the meaning of the descent and distribution statute,( and
therefore, is not entitled to share in the intestate estate of his
foster parent. While the parent is living, however, and standing
in loco parentis to him, the child's rights are the same as those
of a natural child.
7
The legal duty of a parent to support his natural offspring
can be based on one of two possible theories.8 Under the first,
1. 67 CJ.S. Parent & Child § 71 (1950).
2. Smith v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 212 S.C. 332, 47 S.E.2d 725 (1948).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1952 (1962).
4. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-2581 to -2587 (1962).
5. Hatchell v. Norton, 170 S.C. 272, 170 S.E. 341 (1933).
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-52.1 (1962).
7. Young v. Hipple, 273 Pa. 439, 117 Atl. 185 (1922).
8. Comment, 32 L.J. 825 (1923).
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the duty is treated as a natural one, arising from the parent's
voluntary act of bringing the child into the world.9 This theory
would, therefore, be inapplicable in the case of an in loco parentis
relationship. Under the second, the parent becomes obligated to
support the child in return for his right to the services and
custody of the child. Like a natural parent, one standing in loco
parentis is entitled to the services and custody of the child,'0
and, applying this theory, he should have, so long as he retains
this right, the same duty to support.
It appears that the major legal difference between the rela-
tionship of natural parent-natural child and the relationship of
in loco parentis is that the latter is consensual and temporary
in nature. The beginning of the in loco parentis relationship
depends on the intention of the parent;" however, it can be
ended at the will of either party.12 This termination feature
served as the basis of the holding in Chestnut v. Chestnut.13
One possible reason for allowing termination at will of the
in loco parentis relationship has been expressed in terms similar
to the contractual principle of mutuality.
And if the step-child may at any time, and against the
will of the step-father, quit his service, it would seem to
necessarily follow that the step-father could require such
child to leave his family with like effect. Were it otherwise,
the child could exact greater duties of the step-parent than
such parent could of the child, when in law, the duty to
support and serve are companion duties, and the child cer-
tainly has no greater right to renounce his fealty to his
master than the master to renounce his duty of support to-
wards the child.
14
9. The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a
principle of natural law: an obligation ... laid on them not only by nature
herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the world ....
By begetting them therefore, they have entered into a voluntary obligation,
to endeavour, as far as in them lies, that the life which they have be-
stowed shall be supported and preserved. And thus the children will have
a perfect right of receiving maintenance from their parents.
1 BLACKSTONE, COIfSIENTARIES 446 (1818).
10. 67 C.J.S. Parent & Child §§ 73, 74 (1950).
11. Schnieder v. Schnieder, 25 N.J. Misc. 180, 52 A.2d 564 (1947). Cf.
Fitzpatrick v. Hudson Coal Co., 159 Pa. Super. 53, 46 A.2d 589 (1946).
12. Franklin v. Franklin, 75 Ariz. 151, 253 P.2d 337 (1953); In re Mc-
Cardle's Estate, 95 Colo. 250, 35 P.2d 850 (1934) ; Wood v. Wood, 166 Ga. 519,
143 S.E. 770 (1928) ; State ex rel. Gilman v. Bacon, 249 Iowa 1233, 91 N.W2d
395 (1958).
13. 147 S.E.2d 269 (S.C. 1966).
14. RoDGERs, DorEsTIc RELATIONs § 496 (1899), citing Freto v. Brown,
4 Mass. 675 (1808).
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Despite the appealing logic of this approach, it would seem
that a sounder reason for allowing termination at will of the in
loco parentis relationship is based on public policy. The major
virtue of the present rule is that the foster parent has ample
time to decide whether a permanent relationship is desirable
and, if he so desires, to legally adopt the foster child. On the
other hand, if it were held that the relationship acquired a per-
manency from the outset, potential foster parents would be dis-
couraged from taking in homeless children. 15
The court noted in Chestnut that the child was not adopted
"nor is there present any agreement or other circumstance which
would warrant a holding that any obligation of the defendant
to the child was a permanent one."'( This wording infers that
the court might have held differently had there existed any oral
or written adoption agreement.1'7 This would seem improbable,
however, in light of the court's earlier holding that a foster child
who has not been legally adopted in strict compliance with the
provisions of the South Carolina adoption statute, is not a
"child" within the meaning of the descent and distribution
statute.18 Moreover, as to the court's inference that other "cir-
cumstances" may have allowed it to hold differently, one can
only speculate as to what "circumstances" it contemplated.
In any event, if the court had decided that an in loco parentis
relationship could not be terminated at will, it could have found
no support in prior decisions.
JAms J. BAnwnx
15. It would seem that this argument would apply equally well to a step-
child since the possible death of his remaining natural parent makes him a
potential homeless child.
16. Supra note 13, at 270.
17. On the other hand, where a child has been led to rely solely on the
support of his parent standing in loco parentis to him and the child cannot
be restored to his original position, there seems to be an argument for estop-
ping such a parent from denying that a permanent relationship exists. See
Jones v. Guy, 135 Tex. 398, 143 S.W.2d 906 (1940); 15 BAYLOR L. Rav. 162
(1963).
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INSURANCE-Certificate of Title Law-Non-owner's automo-
bile insurance policy held not to cover one who had bought a
car and was in actual possession of it, although he had not re-
ceived a certificate of title-Grain Dealer's Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Julian (S.C. 1965).
The plaintiff insurer brought this action under the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act' for a determination of its liability
under a non-owner's liability policy it had issued to one of the
defendants, Charles A. Julian. The policy expressly excluded
any automobile owned by him. Julian had bought a car about six
months before the accident and the agreed purchase price was
to be paid in weekly installments over a twenty-five week period
and a chattel mortgage was executed. Although Julian took pos-
session of the automobile, a certificate of title had never been
assigned or delivered to him as required by the certificate of
title law. 2 Julian was involved in an automobile accident while
driving the car and while this policy was in effect. The passen-
gers of the car he collided with brought suit for personal in-
juries. The plaintiff insurer contended that Julian was the true
owner of the automobile and was not covered by the policy. The
defendant contended that a certificate of title was necessary to
establish ownership according to the certificate of title law.3
A special referee found for the plaintiff and the defendant
excepted to the referee's report and these exceptions were heard
by the resident judge. The judge reversed the referee's report,
finding for the defendants. 4 On appeal to the Supreme Court of
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2001 (1962).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-150 (1962).
3. How voluntary transfer carried out: when transfer effective-If an owner
manufacturer or dealer transfers his interest in a vehicle other than by
creation of a security interest, he shall, at the time of the delivery of the
vehicle, execute an assignment and warranty of title to transferee in the
space provided therefor on the certificate or as the Department prescribes
and cause the certificate and assignment to be mailed or delivered to the
transferee or to the Department.
Except as provided in § 46-150.16, the transferee shall, promptly after
delivery to him of the vehicle, execute the application for a new certifi-
cate of title in the space provided therefor on the certificate or as the
Department prescribes and cause the certificate and application to be
mailed or delivered to the Department.
Except as provided in § 46-150.16, and as between the parties a trans-
fer by an owner is not effective until the provisions of this section have
been complied with.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-150.15 (1962).
4. Sevdral other defendants were joined with Julian-the owner-passenger
of the automobile he collided with, the owner's insurance company with which
the owner had a policy containing the standard uninsured motorist endorse-
ment, and two other passengers.
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South Carolina, held, reversed. Even though Julian did not have
a certificate of title as required by law, he was the actual owner
of the automobile and was not covered by the plaintiff's policy.
Grain Dealer's Hut. Ins. Co. v. Julian, 145 S.E.2d 685 (S.C.
1965). (5-to-O).
The crucial issue before the court in Grain Dealer's Hut. Ins.
Co. v. Julian5 was whether to regard the certificate of title law
as merely a regulatory measure, not affecting transfer of owner-
ship in an automobile sale, or as establishing an exclusive method
for the transfer of legal title. The court followed the majority
rule in holding that it was merely a policy measure, regulatory
in nature.6
The liability of the insurer under a non-owner's policy is usual-
ly determined by statutory construction, that is, by the construc-
tion of the certificate of title law and the financial responsibility
laws.7 In Booth v. American Cas. Co.," the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that under the assigned
risk plan where the insured had received a non-owner's policy
and had his automobile registered in the name of his sister when
the collision occurred, the insurer was not liable on the policy
for any judgment recovered against the insured as a result of
the collision, because he was the actual owner of the car. The
insured contended that the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility
Act 9 had the broad purpose of the protection of the public; there-
fore, a liberal construction of the act was required to attain this
goal by granting coverage regardless of certain provisions of the
policy. The insured relied on certain provisions of the act for
5. 145 S.E.2d 685 (S.C. 1965).
6. Inland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stallings, 263 F.2d 852 (4th Cir. 1959); Olin
M. Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Southwest Cas. Co., 149 F. Supp. 600 (D.C.
Ark. 1957); Commercial Credit Co. v. McNelly, 36 Del. 88, 171 At. 446
(1934); Moore v. Wilson, 230 Ky. 49, 18 S.W.2d 873 (1929); Bond Lumber
Co. v. Timmons, 82 Mont. 497, 267 Pac. 802 (1928). Contra, Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. Tubb, 242 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1957); Taylor v. Burdick, 320 Mich.
25, 30 N.W.2d 418 (1948); Kelso v. Kelso, 306 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. 1957).
7. In construing the provisions of an operator's policy respecting the owner-
ship of the vehicle involved, the courts will ordinarily be guided by the
language of the statute providing for such policies and the broad pur-
poses of public policy which it was designed to effectuate.
Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 995, 1009 (1963).
8. 261 °F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1958). Accord, Stanley v. Reserve Ins. Co., 238
S.C. 533, 121 S.E.2d 10 (1961); Barkley v. International Mut. Ins. Co., 227
S.C. 38, 86 S.E.2d 602 (1955).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-701 (1962).
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support.10 The court found that the act did not require that a
policy issued under the assigned risk plan must cover all risks
regardless of the circumstances. Where the policy met the re-
quirements of the act, the claims of third parties had to stand or
fall upon the contract actually entered into by the insured and
the insurer. This is the view of most states with financial respon-
sibility laws similar to South Carolina's." The defendants in
Julian made the same argument as the defendants in Booth, and
apparently with the same result, although the court did not dis-
cuss the issue.
In Julian, the defendants relied heavily on section 46-150.15
of the certificate of title law which states that, except as between
the parties, a transfer is not effective until the act has been
complied with. The defendants contended that since the automo-
bile had been given to Julian's vendor without a certificate of
title and he had then sold the automobile to Julian without one,
Julian was a third party to the original unlawful transfer, and
the exception "as between the parties" did not apply.12 It also
may be said that many of the jurisdictions which have held sim-
ilarly to the court in Julian rely on the fact that their certificate
of title laws do not have the "pivotal section" similar to the one
mentioned above expressly declaring unlawful transfers void,18
and those which have held to the contrary do have these pro-
visions, as South Carolina does, and rely on them.'
4
10. The sections relied on by the insured, § 46-75028 and § 46-750.26, were
repealed in 1963. The applicable section now seems to be § 46-750.32 which
reads:
No policy or contract of bodily injury liability insurance, covering liabil-
ity arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle,
shall be issued or delivered in this state . . . unless it contains a pro-
vision insuring the persons defined as insured against loss from liability
imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance
or use of such motor vehicle ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.32 (Supp. 1964).
11. See, e.g., Yashida v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 240 F2d 828 (9th Cir. 1957);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Amerton Auto Ins. Co., 220 Md. 497, 154 A.2d 826
(1959) ; Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 995, 1009 (1963). But see, e.g., Indiana Lumber-
men's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parton, 197 F. Supp. 887 (D.C.N.C. 1957) (governing
statute made title to vehicle the test for ownership); Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d
995, 1010 (1963).
12. As the defendants pointed out, none of the cases by the plaintiff or by
the court in the opinion dealt with a transfer which was the second in a
series of unlawful transfers and the transferring owner himself had never re-
ceived a certificate of title.
13. E.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. McNelly, supra note 5; Carolina Discount
Corp. v. Landis Motor Co., 190 N.C. 157, 129 S.E. 414, 417 (1925); Com-
mercial Credit Co. v. Schreyer, 120 Ohio St. 568, 166 N.E. 808 (1929).
14. E.g., Kahn v. Lockhart, 392 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 1965); National Bank
v. Greensboro Motor Co., 142 S.E.2d 166 (N.C. 1965).
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In Truck Ins. Exeh. Co. v. Sehuenemann,l5 the Texas Court
of Civil Appeals held that a defendant who had a non-owner's
policy with the plaintiff was not covered by it, when the acci-
dent occurred while he was driving a car his father had given
him, but had failed to deliver the title to him as required by the
Certificate of Title Act.16 The Texas act expressly provides that
all sales not conforming to it wit! be void 17 The court held,
however, that this did not apply to title passage between the
parties. The purpose of the statute was to prevent theft, importa-
tion of stolen vehicles and sale of encumbered vehicles; therefore,
it is fairly clear that the court meant as between the parties to
the sales contract rights of ownership passed, regardless of who
held the certificate of title. Lynch v. United States Branch Gen.
Ace. Fire & Life Assur. Corp.18 has similarly construed section
46-150.15 of the South Carolina certificate of title law, holding
that the law affects only those who would assert a property in-
terest in the automobile and not third party insurance carriers.
The clear majority rule as to ownership is that a certificate of
title is not conclusive proof of ownership, but rather evidence
which is rebuttable- 9 When a buyer pays sufficient considera-
tion for an automobile under a valid sales contract, takes posses-
sion and exercises all of the incidents of ownership, he becomes
in fact its true owner.
2 0
MARvIN JACKSON
15. 391 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Ct Civ. App. 1965); Contra, Kahn v. Lockhart,
supra note 14.
16. TEXAS PEN. CODE ANN., art. 1436-1 §§ 1-64 (1953).
17. TEXAS PEN. CODE ANN., art. 1436-1 § 53 (1953).
18. 327 F.2d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 1964).
19. E.g., Cooper v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 347 F.2d 361 (6th Cir.
1965) ; Bankers Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 244 S.C. 552, 137 S.E2d 785 (1964) ; Motor
Fin. Co. v. Wolff, 387 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1965).
20. Owner-A person, other than a Lien holder, having the property in or
title to a vehicle. The term includes a person entitled to the use and
possession of a vehicle subject to a security interest in another person
but excludes a lessee under a lease not intended as a security.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-139.22 (1962).
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INSURANCE-Liability of Insurer on Uninsured Motorist En-
dorsement-Construction of notice by insured to insurer of acci-
dent "as soon as practicable" and notice of suit against the unin-
sured "immediately'--Squires v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co.,
Skipper v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (S.C. 1965).
Since the two cases involved are identical as to causes of action
and proceedings, no distinction will be made between them. The
plaintiffs' intestates, together with Effie Johnson and three
other parties, all passengers in an automobile owned by Lorenzer
Squires and insured by National Grange, were killed as the re-
sult of a head-on collision with Leroy Sessions. Suits for wrong-
ful death were instituted in September 1961 against Sessions by
the plaintiffs and the administrators of the estate of Effie John-
son.' Sessions's insurer denied coverage and refused to defend.
A judgment was rendered for Effie Johnson against Sessions
on April 24, 1962 and was later affirmed by the South Carolina
Supreme Court.2 On April 23, the plaintiffs, after discovering
the denial of coverage, forwarded a copy of the summons and
complaint in their actions to the defendant and thereby notified
it for the first time that Sessions was possibly an uninsured
motorist. In response, the defendant denied coverage under
Squires' uninsured motorist provisions because of plaintiffs' fail-
ure to forward immediately copies of the suit papers when the
suits were first brought. In December 1962, the defendant for-
mally withdrew and the plaintiffs were awarded default judg-
ments. The present suits were brought against the defendant to
enforce payment. The trial court entered judgment for the plain-
tiffs. On appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, held,
affirmed. Notice to an insurer of the commencement of an action
at the time it is discovered that the defendant has become an
uninsured motorist meets the requirement of the Uninsured Mo-
torist Act that the insured should immediately forward to the
insurer a copy of process served in an action against an unin-
sured motorist. Squires v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., Skip-
per v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 145 S.E.2d 673 (S.C. 1965).
The uninsured motorist law basically rests on a conflict of
interests. In a proceeding against an uninsured motorist, the in-
sured and his insurer become opposing parties since the insurer is
1. Skipper v. Hartley, 242 S.C. 221, 130 S.E.2d 486 (1963). Because
Hartley was engaged in an automobile race with Sessions at the time of
the accident, they were held jointly liable in this suit.
2. Skipper v. Hartley, supra note 1.
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subrogated to the rights of the uninsured motorist and must pay
any damages recovered against him to the insured. In exainining
problems arising from this divergence of interests, it is worth-
while to reflect that the fundamental policy behind the enact-
ment of the uninsured motorist statute3 was the desire on the
part of the legislature to protect the insured motorist against
financial loss occasioned as a result of an accident with an unin-
sured motorist. The frequency and severity of automobile acci-
dents necessitated a system shifting the burden of loss from the
innocent traffic victim to the insurance company.
4
Consistent with this objective, most courts have taken a liberal
view when dealing with the question of coverage; however, the
procedural obligations that the insured must discharge in order
to recover, since they are prescribed by statute, have been viewed
by the courts as mandatory and strict compliance with them has
been a prerequisite to recovery.5
These conflicting considerations collide in the area of notice
of the uninsured status of a tort-feasor that the insured must
give his carrier notice of the accident "as soon as practicable"
and notice (furnishing a copy of summons and complaint) of
commencement of legal action against the uninsured motorist
"immediately". The purpose of the provision for proof of claim
and notice of suit is to allow the insurer an opportunity to pro-
tect its interests and to prevent fraud and imposition upon it.,
Notice of the accident (or "proof of claim") "as soon as prac-
ticable" has been construed as an ambulatory provision subject
to the impact of particular facts on particular cases, generally
requiring notice within a reasonable time under all the circum-
stances.7 Since the uninsured motorist endorsement becomes op-
erative at the time it is ascertained that the operator was unin-
sured rather than at the time of the accident,8 proof of claim "as
soon as practicable" has been interpreted as if it read "within a
reasonable time after discovery of the uninsured status" assuming
3. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-750.11 to -750.28 (1962).
4. 14 U. FLA. L. REv. 479 (1962).
5. 490 INS. L.J. 660 (1963).
6. 7 AM. JUR. 2d Automobile Insurance § 139 (1963).
7. Brown v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 233 S.C. 376, 104 S.E.2d 673 (1958).
It is interesting to note that the court borrowed this construction from
the case of Young v. Travelers Ins. Co., 119 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1941).
8. North River Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 244 S.C. 393, 137 S.E.2d 264 (1964).
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that the insured was reasonably diligent in his efforts to deter-
mine the insurance status of his adversary.9
The requirement of "immediate" notice of commencement of
legal action against the uninsured driver is more elusive. The
general rule has been that the liability carrier is bound by the
result of the litigation only when it has had notice of the action
and an opportunity to control its proceedings.10 Squires v. Na-
tional Grange Mut. Ins. Co." presents the question of when no-
tice of suit is required if the tort-feasor was insured at the time
of the collision but subsequently became uninsured because of a
denial of coverage by his carrier for breach of a condition prece-
dent. The plaintiffs apparently gave notice to National Grange
immediately upon being informed by Sessions's carrier that it
had denied coverage to him sometime after the accident, upon
discovery of misstatements in his application. The court held
that this met the requirement of "immediate" notice even though
it was given in April of 1962, seven months after commencement
of suit against Sessions in September of 1961. At the time of
notice the insurer still had opportunity to protect itself since
the action did not come to trial until December, 1962, some eight
months later.
However, the court in omitting to even mention the existence
of this opportunity raised by implication an important question:
What would have been the result if the action against Sessions
had gone to judgment before plaintiffs had learned of his unin-
sured status and then, upon learning it, plaintiffs had imme-
diately notified National Grange? The holding of the court cer-
tainly leaves the question open:
Notice of the commencement of the wrongful death actions
was given to the appellant [defendant] when Sessions be-
came an uninsured motorist. This met the requirement of
condition No. 3 of the uninsured motorist endorsement.12
9. Brown v. Motor Vehicle Acci. Indemnification Corp., 24 Misc. 2d 550,
206 N.Y.S.2d 294 (Sup. Ca 1960).
10. 9 APPLEMAIu, INSURANCE LAw 4860 (1962), 5 Ame. JuR. Automobile
Insurance § 191 (1936). This is the rule in South Carolina. Hatchett v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 425, 137 S.E.2d 608 (1964).
11. 145 S.E.2d 673 (S.C. 1965).
12. Id. at 679. Condition No. 3 reads: "Notice of Legal Action. If, before the
company makes payment of loss hereunder, the insured or his legal repre-
sentative shall institute any legal action for bodily injury or property
against any person or organization legally responsible for the use of an
automobile involved in the accident, a copy of the summons and complaint
or other process served in connection with such legal action shall be for-
warded immediately to the company by the insured or his legal repre-
sentative." Id. at 676-77.
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The question has never previously been litigated in any jurisdic-
tion. This case seems to move in the direction of sacrificing the
interests of the insurance company to those of its insured who
has suffered damage from an uninsured motorist whenever the
interests of the former would deny those of the latter.
JAs L. MAN, II
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PROPERTY-Cost of Utility Relocation-Owner of water and
sewer lines within highway right of way must bear the cost of
relocating such facilities when necessitated by highway improve-
ments-South Carolina State Bighway Dep't v. Parker Water &
Sewer Sub-Dist. (S.C. 1966).
The plaintiff undertook the construction of a state secondary
road in Greenville County with the federal government bearing
fifty per cent of the cost. The defendant owned certain utility
lines located in the right of way of the highway under construc-
tion. The construction work necessitated the relocation of these
lines. No agreement had ever existed between the defendant and
either Greenville County or the state concerning which would
bear the cost of relocation should it become necessary. Upon the
defendant's refusal to pay, the parties stipulated that the plain-
tiff would initially pay for the relocation with the ultimate
liability to be decided by the courts. This action was brought to
recover from the defendant the cost of relocating the lines. The
lower court granted recovery. On appeal to the South Carolina
Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The owner of utility lines located
in the highway right of way must bear the cost of their reloca-
tion if necessitated by highway construction. South Carolina
State Highway Dep't v. Parker Water & Sewer Sub-Dist., 146
S.E.2d 160 (S.C. 1966). (4-to-0).
The primary purpose of highways has always been for the use
of the travelling public.1 In more modern times, highways have
been used to promote the public health and welfare through
improved methods of transporting communications and sanita-
tion.2 Some examples of such secondary uses of the highways
are telephone, telegraph, hydroelectric, water, and sewer lines
located within the highway right of way. Use of the highways
in this manner has spared the utility companies the need to
condemn and purchase the necessary land.
The common law rule is that a utility which has placed its
facilities within the highway right of way is required to pay
the cost of relocating those facilities when the relocation is made
necessary by highway maintenance or construction. These sec-
1. See Opinion of the justices, 101 N.H. 527, 132 A.2d 613 (1957).
2. Ibid.
3. State v. Town of Grants, 66 N.M. 355, 348 P.2d 274 (1960). See 25
Am. JUR. Highways § 182 (1940).
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ondary uses are subject to the police power of the state.4 There-
fore, the loss suffered by the utility owner in relocating its
facilities is damnum absque injuria.
5
South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Parker Water &
Sewer Sub-Dist.6 presents a question of novel impression in
South Carolina. In an official opinion given several years prior
to this decision, the Attorney General of South Carolina ex-
pressed a belief that in circumstances similar to those here the
South Carolina courts would follow the common law rule.7
The court has adopted piecemeal some of the bases for the
rule. It stated in Leonard v. Talbert8 that the state has absolute
control over the streets and highways within its borders. The
principle that any secondary use of the highway is always sub-
ject to the police power was recognized in Sammons v. City of
Beaufort.9 In Prosser v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. 10 the court held
that requiring a railroad to establish, maintain, or abolish a
grade crossing at its own expense where a new street crosses its
tracks was within the police power.
The defendant contended that since it was a political sub-
division and derived its income wholly from taxes the common
law rule should not apply to it. There is no sound basis for draw-
ing a distinction between privately owned and municipally
owned utilities." That is especially true here since the defendant
was acting in a proprietary rather than a governmental ca-
pacity.1 2 The cases fail to recognize a difference between the
two.'
3
The defendant also contended that the state should bear the
cost because if it did so the federal government would share
fifty per cent of the burden.14 Several cases were cited in support
4. New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Conm'n, 197 U.S. 453, 460
(1905) ; Opinion of the Justices, supra note 1; see 25 AM. JUR. Highways
§ 182 (1940).
5. New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Conm'n, supra note 4, at 462.
6. 146 S.E.2d 160 (S.C. 1966).
7. 1958-1959 Ops. AiT'y GEN., S.C. 106.
8. 222 S.C. 79, 83, 71 S.E.2d 603, 604 (1952).
9. 225 S.C. 490, 83 S.E.2d 153 (1954).
10. 216 S.C. 33, 56 S.E.2d 591 (1949).
11. State ex rel. City of Albuquerque v. Lavender, 69 N.M. 220, 365 P.2d
652, 663 (1961).
12. State v. Town of Grants, 66 N.M. 355, 360, 348 P.2d 274, 277 (1960).
13. Public Water Supply Dist. v. State Highway Comm'n, 244 S.W.2d 4
(Mo. 1951) ; State v. Town of Grants, supra note 3; Pack v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 387 S.W.2d 789 (Tenn. 1965) ; City of San Antonio v. Bexar
Metropolitan Water Dist., 309 S.W2d 491 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1958).
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of this contention. These cases are all alike, however, in that
they are all from states having statutes in abrogation of the
common law rule.' In the absence of a South Carolina statute
allowing for payment of the cost of relocation by the state,
the common law rule applies. The cases cited by the defendant
were therefore of minor significance in deciding this case. The
defendant overlooked the section of the federal statute which
prohibits reimbursement of the state when paymnt to the utility
violates the law of the state.10 Under the common law the state
could not legally pay the cost of relocation and in the absence
of a statute to the contrary the court reached the only possible
decision.
G. GonIo HAEIisoN
14. Federal-Aid Highways Act § 123, 72 Stat. 900 (1958), 23 U.S.C. § 123
(1964).
15. See, e.g., State Highway Dep't v. Delaware Power & Light Co., 39 Del.
Ch. 467, 167 A.2d 27 (1961) ; see also 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 302 (1960).
16. Federal-Aid Highways Act § 123, supra note 14.
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PROPERTY-Eminent Domain-Temporary flooding of pri-
vate land by public reservoir constitutes a taking for public use
without just compensation-Lindsey v. City of Greenville (S.C.
1966).
In June 1961 waters released in operation of the defendant's
dam and reservoir on the North Saluda River destroyed the
plaintiff's bean crop. In an effort to keep the accumulating
waters in the reservoir at a desired level after a heavy rainfall,
the defendant's employees had begun discharging large amounts
of water through a pipeline located at the bottom of the dam
into the river. As a result, the plaintiff's land lying below the
dam was submerged in several feet of water for approximately
twenty hours, and his crop was destroyed.
The plaintiff's action was based upon an alleged unlawful
taking of his property by the defendant for public use without
just compensation1 in violation of article 1, section 17, of the
South Carolina Constitution of 1895.2 The trial court denied the
defendant's request for a directed verdict. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of South Carolina, held, affirmed. Permitting
flooding of the plaintiff's crop by discharging water from the
city reservoir constituted a taking for a public use without just
compensation where it was reasonably inferable that in the
normal operation of the reservoir similar discharges would take
place in the future. Lind3ey v. City of Greenville, 146 S.E.2d
863 (S.C. 1966). (4-to-0).
The word "taking" as used in a constitutional provision for
compensation has been said to be incapable of precise definition
at any given time.3 The traditional view of taking of private
property in situations where the owner continues in use and
possession of his property, is to deny compensation for injury
and damage to the property however much it may be depreciated
in value.4 In jurisdictions allowing recovery for something short
of actual appropriation, the authorities are not in harmony as
1. As to actions in tort see generally, Webb v. Greenwood County, 299
S.C. 267, 92 S.E.2d 688 (1956); Parish v. Town of Yorkville, 96 S.C. 24, 79
S.E. 635 (1912).
2. "Private property shall not be taken for . . . public use without just
compensation being first made therefore." S.C. CoNST. art. 1 § 17 (1895).
3. Gasque v. Town of Convay, 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E.2d 871 (1940); 29A
C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 131 (1965).
4. Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924) ; Hurt v. Atlanta, 100
Ga. 274, 28 S.E. 65 (1897) ; see generally 18 Am. JuR. Eminent Domain § 132
(1936); 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.38 (1963).
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to the degree of damage or interference with the rights, use and
enjoyment of ownership of property that is necessary to justify
compensation. 5
South Carolina does not recognize a distinction between "tak-
ing" and "damaging." 6 The cases indicate that interference of a
permanent nature with the beneficial use and enjoyment of prop-
erty is equivalent to actual appropriation.7 In Gasque v. Town
of Conway,8 the court said that, "property in a thing consists
not merely in its ownership and possession, but in the unre-
stricted right of use, enjoyment, and disposal [and] anything
which destroys one or more of these elements, destroys the prop-
erty itself."0 The court in Gasque made quite clear that such
"taldng" or damage must be of a permanent nature and growing
out of a deliberate or positive act on the part of the defendant.
Mere negligence or error in judgment on the part of public offi-
cials or employees is not sufficient to support a cause of action.' 0
The question involved in Lindsey v. City of Greenville" is
whether a single instance of flooding and destruction of a crop
on the land constitutes damage of a permanent nature. South
Carolina has had several cases involving flooding or interference
with drainage of land by a public or quasi-public operation or
project where compensation has been allowed.12 The leading case
5. Woodside v. City of Atlanta, 214 Ga. 75, 103 S.E.2d 108 (1958) ; Staton
v. Norfolk & C. Ry., 111 N.C. 278, 16 S.E. 181 (1892); Norwood v. Sheen,
126 Ohio St. 482, 186 N.E. 102 (1933); see generally 18 AM. JUR. Eminent
Dontain §§ 131-32 (1936).
6. Collins v. City of Greenville, 233 S.C. 506, 105 S.E.2d 704 (1958) ; Webb
v. Greenwood County, 229 S.C. 267, 92 S.E.2d 688 (1956); Moss v. State
Highway Dep't, 223 S.C. 282, 75 S.E.2d 462 (1953) ; Rice Hope Plantation v.
Carolina Pub. Serv. Authority, 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950); Gasque
v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E.2d 871 (1940); Milhous v. State
Highway Dep't, 194 S.C. 33, 8 S.E.2d 852 (1940); Henderson v. City of
Greenwood, 172 S.C. 16, 172 S.E. 689 (1935); Taylor v. Lexington Water
Power Co., 165 S.C. 120, 163 S.E. 137 (1932); Chick Springs Water Co. v.
State Highway Dep't, 178 S.C. 415, 183 S.E. 27 (1930); White v. Southern
Ry., 142 S.C. 284, 140 S.E. 560 (1927) ; Kneece v. City of Columbia, 128 S.C.
375, 123 S.E. 100 (1924) ; Derrick v. City of Columbia, 122 S.C. 29, 114 S.E.
857 (1922); Faust v. Richland County, 117 S.C. 251, 109 S.E. 151 (1921);
Wilson v. Greenville County, 110 S.C. 321, 96 S.E. 301 (1918).
7. Ibid.
8. 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E.2d 871 (1940).
9. Id. at 21, 8 S.E.2d at 876.
10. Gasque v. Town of Conway, srupra note 8; Collins v. City of Greenville,
233 S.C. 506, 105 S.E.2d 704 (1958).
11. 146 S.E.2d 863 (S.C. 1966).
12. King v. United States, 59 Fed. 9 (D.S.C. 1893), appeal dismissed, 164
U.S. 703 (1893); Milhous v. State Highway Dep't, 194 S.C. 33, 8 S.E.2d
852 (1940) ; Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 178 S.C. 415,
183 S.E. 27 (1930).
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is Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dep't,'3 where
the negligent construction of a culvert and change in a road bed
caused repeated flooding of plaintiff's property. The court held
that "flooding and injuring of property by negligent impound-
ing of a natural water course is taking within the constitutional
prohibition of taking of private property for public use without
just compensation."' 4 A later case, Milhous v. State Highway
Dep't'5 with a fact situation similar to Chick Springs, held that
the damaging of property by obstructing a stream, by casting
of surface waters in force and impounded quantities, or by mere
obstruction of natural flow of surface waters, constitutes a tak-
ing of the property within the constitutional provision requiring
just compensation. The difference between the Chick Springs-
MA ilhous cases and the Lindsey case is that the former cases in-
volved actions for permanent damage to the land itself by
repeated acts resulting in abandonment and diminished produc-
tivity of the land. In Lindsey, the action was brought after the
first flooding for the destruction of a product of the land, not
the land itself.
This distinction is quite material in light of Collins v. City of
Greenville'G where the court denied compensation for the negli-
gent back-up of a sewer resulting in temporary damage to plain-
tiff's property as being neither permanent nor stemming from a
positive act but a mere single isolated instance resulting in in-
jury to plaintiff. The defendant therefore contended that Collins
was more in point with the present case than the Chick Springs-
Milhous line.
In Lindsey the court stated that "such flooding would in all
probability occur again,"'1T and was thus sufficient to reach the
required degree of permanency. Furthermore, the evidence
showed the release of water was not a product of negligence, but
rather a deliberate act done to maintain the desired water level
and protect the respondent's dam. Weight may be added to the
Lindsey holding in considering that here plaintiff's loss was a
crop, permanently destroyed. No residue of value remained when
the waters receded. The court confined Collins to cases where
the resulting injury shows little probability of recurrence.
H. Srx.-icER KNG
13. 178 S.C. 415, 183 S.E. 27 (1930).
14. Id. at 423, 183 S.E. at 30.
15. 194 S.C. 33, 8 S.E.2d 852 (1940).
16. 233 S.C. 506, 105 S.E.2d 704 (1958).
17. 146 S.E.2d 863, 867 (S.C. 1966).
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TORTS-Product Liability-Manufacturer of defective product
liable for injuries to one who was neither a remote vendee nor
a user of the product-Salladin v. Tellis (S.C. 1966).
The plaintiff, administratrix of the estate of the deceased
William Homer Bennet, brought this action for wrongful death
against the defendant Universal Manufacturing Corporation.
The deceased was electrocuted while repairing lighting fixtures
and wiring, parts of which were manufactured by the defendant.
The defendant demurred on the grounds that the complaint
failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action since
the deceased was not in privity of contract with Universal, was
not a remote vendee of the product manufactured by Universal
and was not using the product. The trial court overruled the
demurrer. On appeal to the Supreme Court of South Carolina,
held, affirmed. The manufacturer of a product, which is likely
to cause injury if negligently made, is liable to all persons whom
he should expect to be endangered by its probable use. Salladin.
,v. Tellis, 146 S.E.2d 875 (S.C. 1966). (4-to-O).
Justice Cardozo's landmark decision in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor 00.1 is the first major chapter in the continuing story of
the modern development of product liability law. MacPherson
held that the manufacturer of a finished product, reasonably
certain to place life and limb in danger if negligently made, is
liable to a remote vendee for injuries which result from the ex-
pected use of the product when'the manufacturer knows that the
article will likely be used by persons other than his immediate
vendee without further inspection. This decision is now accepted
throughout the United States.2
The long asserted general rules requires privity of contract
in tort actions based on injuries caused by defective products.
On its face MacPherson expanded the general rule to include
the "inherently dangerous product" exception. 4 In reality, how-
ever, MacPhterson heralded the beginning of the end for the
privity requirement in such cases,5 for later cases have expanded
1. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2. PROSSER, TowRs 661 (3d ed. 1964).
3. Id. at 659; 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 100 (1950).
4. E.g., Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
5. See, e.g., Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693, 700
(1946), which said, "The MacPherson case caused the exception to
swallow the asserted general rule of nonliability . . ..
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the decision to include many other classes of litigants.0 Not only
remote vendees, but also members of the purchaser's family,7 his
employees,8 and other consumers and users 9 have been allowed
recovery; not only manufacturers of finished products, but also
manufacturers of component parts,10 other sellers" and repair-
men 1 2 have been held liable to third parties.
South Carolina first recognized the MacPherson decision by
dictum in Odom v. Ford Motor o.13 The first application of
the decision in South Carolina came in Beasley v. Ford Motor
Go.' 4-itself an extension of MacPherson. In Beasley the plain-
tiff was allowed recovery for injuries growing out of the use of
an automobile that she did not own; the plaintiff was the wife
of the remote vendee of the automobile.
Salladin v. Tellis,15 however, extends protection to one who
was neither a remote vendee nor a user of the defendant's prod-
uct. In Salladin the plaintiff's deceased was a business invitee
of the remote vendee.
16
The Salladin decision is in accord with the weight of modern
authority. The Restatement of Torts, for example, extends pro-
tection to "those [plaintiffs] whom he [the manufacturer]
6. The expansion of the principle of liability without privity is today most
evident in the implied warranty area. Even this traditional stronghold of
the privity requirement has yielded rapidly in recent years to the logic
of the MacPherson line of tort decisions. See generally Note, 17 S.C.L.
REV. 259 (1965).
7. E.g., Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. App. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. 1948);
McLeod v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S.W.2d 122 (1927).
8. E.g., Marsh Wood Prod. Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209,
240 N.W. 392 (1932).
9. E.g., Reed & Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1934).
10. E.g., Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932).
11. E.g., Gaidry Motors, Inc. v. Brannon, 268 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1954).
12. E.g., Jones v. Raney Chevrolet Co., 217 N.C. 693, 9 S.E.2d 395 (1940).
13. 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E2d 601 (1956).
14. 237 S.C. 506, 117 S.E2d 863 (1961).
15. 146 S.E2d 875 (S.C. 1966).
16. Salladin extends the South Carolina application of the MacPheron
doctrine in another way; namely, the appellant in Salladin was a manufacturer
of a component part, not the finished product. This point was not raised
by the appellant and was not discussed in the court's opinion, but the allowance
of recovery from the manufacturer of a component part in tort cases is in accord
with the decisions of other jurisdictions. E.g., Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y.
292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932). PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 664. But cf.
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592
(1963) in which a different result was reached in an implied warranty case.
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should expect to be endangered by its [the product's] probable
use.'17 The comment following this statement explains:
The words "those whom he should expect to be endangered
by its probable use" may ... include a large group of per-
sons who have no connection with the ownership or use of
the chattel itself . . .. [T]he manufacturer of a cable to
be used in the transmission of high voltage electric current
should reasonably anticipate that if its insulation is defec-
tive its use may endanger even persons miles away from the
cable itself.' 8
The extension of the MacPherson doctrine beyond users and
remote vendees to business invitees and casual bystanders has
found its principal application in two situations. Cases in which
the harm was caused by an exploding bottle have long held the
manufacturer liable for injuries to anyone reasonably and law-
fully in the vicinity'; and pedestrian plaintiffs, whose injuries
have been the result of a defect in a motor vehicle, have been
allowed recovery.
20
Other examples of this extension of MacPherson can be
found,21 but relatively few courts have been called on to decide
this point. A large number of courts, however, have used lan-
guage which arguably would include the plaintiff in Salladin.
Many courts, for example, when confronted with an opportunity
to extend MacPhlerson to include employees of the'remote vendee,
users other than the remote vendee and members of the remote
vendee's family, have stated that the MacPherson doctrine ap-
plies not only to these groups but also to anyone whom the manu-
facturer should reasonably expect to be in the vicinity of the
product's probable use.
22
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), ToRTS § 395 (1965).
18. Id. at 395, comment i. (Emphasis added.)
19. E.g., Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Whidden, 227 Ark. 13, 296 S.W.2d 432
(1956); Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 307 Mo. 520, 271 S.W. 497 (1925).
20. E.g., Gaidry Motors, Inc. v. Brannon, mupra note 11; Kalinowski v. Truck
Equip. Co., 237 App. Div. 472, 261 N.Y. Supp. 657 (1933).
21. E.g., Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820
(1949).
22. E.g., Moran v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908, (3d Cir.
1948); Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946); Beadles v.
Servel, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N.E.2d 405 (1951) ; C. D. Herme, Inc. v.
R. C. Tway Co., 294 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1956); Bock v. Truck & Tractor, Inc.,
18 Wash. 2d 458, 139 P.2d 706 (1943). But cf. Prosser, Assault Upon the
Citadel of Privity, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1142 (1960). A growing number of
jurisdictions are helping the plaintiff to avoid the many problems connected
with proving negligence on the part of a manufacturer by applying the Mac-
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The fact that !acPheron is the law everywhere in the United
States is presumptive evidence that the courts of the country find
appealing the logical basis of that decision.
The exception of imminently dangerous products from the
general rule requiring privity is based upon the broad
ground that the manufacturer of an article which, although
not inherently dangerous, may become so when put to its in-
tended use, owes a duty to the public to employ reasonable
care, skill, and diligence in its manufacture ....
The rule making privity immaterial in imminently dan-
gerous product cases has been called a manifestation of the
principles, first, that everyone is bound to avoid acts or
omissions imminently dangerous to the lives of others, and,
second, that an injury which is a natural and probable result
of an act of negligence is actionable .... 23
The South Carolina Supreme Court accepted this thinking in
Salladin, and although the decision is an extension of the Mac-
Pherson holding, it can hardly be said to be an extension of the
reasoning of that decision.
RoiBERT L. WyNN, IMl
Pherson no-privity rule to implied warranty actions. In other wards, the re-
mote vendee is allowed to sue on implied warranty, and a strict liability situ-
ation is created. No cases of this kind have thus far allowed one who was
neither a remote vendee nor a user or consumer to recover.
23. Annot., 74 A.L.R2d 1111, 1163 (1960).
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